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Abstract This article focuses on a research project conducted in six jurisdictions:
England, The Netherlands, Germany, Australia, Venezuela, and Brazil. These
societies are very different ethnically, socially, politically, economically, historically
and have wildly different levels of crime. Their policing arrangements also differ
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significantly: how they are organised; how their officers are equipped and trained;
what routine operating procedures they employ; whether they are armed; and much
else besides. Most relevant for this research, they represent policing systems with
wildly different levels of police shootings, Police in the two Latin American
countries represented here have a justified reputation for the frequency with which
they shoot people, whereas at the other extreme the police in England do not
routinely carry firearms and rarely shoot anyone. To probe whether these differences
are reflected in the way that officers talk about the use of force, police officers in
these different jurisdictions were invited to discuss in focus groups a scenario in
which police are thwarted in their attempt to arrest two youths (one of whom is a
known local criminal) by the youths driving off with the police in pursuit, and
concludes with the youths crashing their car and escaping in apparent possession of a
gun, It might be expected that focus groups would prove starkly different, and
indeed they were, but not in the way that might be expected. There was little
difference in affirmation of normative and legal standards regarding the use of force.
It was in how officers in different jurisdictions envisaged the circumstances in which
the scenario took place that led Latin American officers to anticipate that they would
shoot the suspects, whereas officers in the other jurisdictions had little expectation
that they would open fire in the conditions as they imagined them to be.
Introduction
Although the articles in this special edition are not restricted to the international research
collaboration that will be the focus of this contribution, they nonetheless all arose, in one
way or another, from it. That collaboration saw scholars in six jurisdictions conduct
research using essentially the samemethodology, thus enabling direct comparisons to be
made between societies, polities, jurisdictions, and cultures—a rarity in research on
policing.
The reason for embarking on such a complex and difficult intellectual enterprise
was to explore issues of paramount interest in police studies. Whether or not the
police have a monopoly over the use of force, there is widespread agreement that the
capacity (and indeed the duty) to use force as an instrument for the achievement of
mandated goals is central to the police role. In all jurisdictions police routinely and
openly carry weapons that are not readily available to the remainder of the
population. It has become a commonplace of police research that whilst recourse to
the use of force is relatively rare [1–3], the capacity to enforce compliance
underwrites a great deal of what the police do. It also poses an acute ethical and
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constitutional issue, for this capacity to use force is easily open to abuse. It is
instructive that authoritarian states earn the sobriquet ‘police state’ because it is the
proverbial knock of the police in the middle of the night that epitomises rule by fear.
As David Bayley long ago remarked and Paul Chevigny more recently reminded us:
‘the police are to the state what the edge is to the knife’ [4]. The six jurisdictions in
which our research was conducted included those with reputations for civility and
others which are now only emerging from authoritarianism. England was the
birthplace of civil policing and has long enjoyed robust democracy; Holland has an
enviable reputation for social and political tolerance; Germany has successfully
awoken from its Nazi nightmare; Australia owes its origins to colonialism and whilst
it has evolved into an independent democracy, still bares the scars of genocidal
racism towards Aboriginal people. On the other hand, both Latin American countries
have only recently emerged from dictatorships—Venezuela in 1958 and Brazil in
1985—and remain plagued by political uncertainty and turmoil.
It is not ‘the state’ that knocks the door in the middle of night, but a police officer—a
corporeal being—acting on its behalf. Whatever influence the state exerts is
communicated through and mediated by the police who are its agents. Whether police
officers do the state’s bidding enthusiastically or reluctantly, facilitate or suborn the
state’s policies, depends to some extent upon how those officers think and feel about the
tasks they are asked to perform. This raises the issue of police culture: the informal
values, beliefs and norms that guide officers in their daily routine and produces the
patterns that are observed in actual police practice, not least of which is officer’s
willingness to use force [5]. Police culture has been portrayed in much of the academic
and policy-related literature as a malign influence: deeply conservative, prejudicial to
minorities, action-obsessed, and tolerant to wrongdoing by fellow officers [6].
However, such a portrait emerges mainly from case studies within specific
jurisdictions. How far do differences in police culture explain the considerable
variance in the police use of force across different jurisdictions? By posing the same
scenario to officers across diverse jurisdictions we hoped to find therein echoes of
distinct police cultures, for if culture is such a powerful influence on the actual
behaviour of officers then we would expect that officers from such divergent
jurisdictions would talk about the use of force in different ways.
Diverse national contexts
Crucial to this research is the diversity of the jurisdictions in which the fieldwork
was conducted. In this section we will explore that diversity.
England and Wales
England and Wales form a single jurisdiction within the UK and is commonly
credited as the birthplace for modern professional civil policing. Today, England is
economically stable thriving country of approximately 60 million people, which has
become rapidly multicultural during the past 50 years.
Policing in England and Wales emerged from a patchwork of arrangements
reflecting political expediency rather than any coherent plan. Until recently, 43
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police forces had more or less unitary responsibility for policing their respective
areas, but in the last few years a national tier of policing has emerged and now
coalesced into the Serious and Organised Crime Agency that amalgamates police,
customs and immigration officers with personnel from other professional back-
grounds, public and private, to fight crime on a transnational and national scale. An
attempt to reduce the number of territorial police forces [7] was recently defeated,
but police are encouraged to collaborate across borders in the interests of efficiency.
This is symptomatic of a centralisation of political responsibility over the police that
has grown markedly in recent years with national governments setting annual targets
enforced by plethora of inspectorates.
The police, once an icon of British society, have become an increasingly controversial
public institution during this same period and their popularity has declined markedly
during the past 30 years [8]. They have been racked by scandals, especially regarding
their relationship with ethnic minorities, whom they are accused of both ‘over-
policing’ and ‘under-protecting’ [9, 10]. One expression of ‘over-policing’ that has
caused repeated controversy has been the use of force. The once traditional unarmed
British ‘bobby’ is now attired in body armour, and carries an assortment of weaponry:
rigid handcuffs, batons openly displayed, and CS incapacitant spray. Most of the 43
police forces maintain 24 hour armed response vehicles able to attend any incident in
which firearms have been used or are suspected as being present. Some of the larger
police forces also maintain what amounts to heavily armed Special Weapons and
Tactics teams for hostage rescue, anti-terrorist operations and other similar duties. As
controversy increasingly engulfed policing so there has been a growth in civilian
oversight, with a succession of organisations (each enjoying greater powers than its
predecessors) having responsibility for investigating allegations of police wrongdoing.
Currently, any occasion in which a person suffers serious injury or death as a result of
police action must be referred to the Independent Police Complaints Commission who
may (and in the case of death invariably does) conduct their own independent
investigation. [11]
Police use of force is not explicitly justified under British legislation, for the
relevant statute states that ‘any person may use such force as is reasonable’ for a
lawful purpose such as preventing crime and apprehending offenders. However, police
officers have duties and capacities that set them apart. Notably, police carry weapons
that would otherwise be illegal. They are also subject to a variety of official guidelines
on how to use force, such as the prohibition on using rigid handcuffs to achieve ‘pain
compliance’. The use of lethal force is only permitted when there is an immediate
threat to life and sole responsibility rests with the officer employing that force.
Netherlands
The Netherlands enjoys similar levels of prosperity to those in the UK, and like Britain,
the Netherlands is a geographically small coastal state with high population density. It has
an imperial history with colonies in the Far East, Caribbean, Latin America and Africa.
As migrants from its former colonies have settled into the Netherlands, it has become an
increasingly multicultural society. This has tested the country’s long established
reputation as the epitome of a liberal political and cultural tradition, especially since the
murder of the right-wing populist politician, Theo van Gogh by an Islamist militant.
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Policing in the Netherlands was traditionally based on municipalities but was
reformed in 1990s into 25 regional forces, with an additional national force
responsible for policing transport arteries, providing services to regional forces (for
instance, forensic analysis) and performing such tasks as diplomatic protection. The
police have dual accountability: on the one hand, they are responsible to the mayor
of the municipalities in which they operate for public order and providing general
assistance, but criminal investigation is the province of the public prosecutor.
Dutch police officers are routinely armed, each with a sidearm. As in Britain, the
Dutch police must use force only with restraint to achieve a lawful purpose and they
too are surrounded by a plethora of official guidance and instruction. Like British
procedures, lethal force is allowed only in the most extreme circumstances, but
unlike Britain (where the officer firing a gun is wholly responsible for doing so and
there is no defence of obeying orders) firearms may be discharged upon the
command of a senior officer and warning shots are prescribed. The use of force in
the Netherlands is frequently a cause for public concern and there have been a series
of controversial incidents in recent years.
Germany
Germany represents the continental tradition of the ‘strong state’ with a history of
authoritarian rule that reached its malign pinnacle during the Nazi period from 1933
to the end of the Second World War in 1945. After the war Germany was divided
into what emerged as an enormously prosperous liberal democratic Federal Republic
in the west and communist dictatorship in the east. Partition ended in 1989 when the
Berlin Wall was famously demolished and the following year the two parts of
Germany were reunited into a single democratic federal state of over 80 million
population. This has imposed economic strains, and whilst Germany continues to be
prosperous, it has begun to suffer problems of unemployment, especially in the
former communist east. Germany too is a multicultural society, with a noticeably
large Turkish population and recent influx of asylum-seekers. In addition
approximately four million people of ethnic German origin have repatriated to
Germany from countries abroad in recent years.
After the Second World War the Federal Republic shrugged off its Napoleonic
policing tradition in favour of a federal system in which each Lander (or state) has full
responsibility for policing. With the assimilation of the former communist east, the
federal systemwas extended throughout the entire country. Apart from responsibility for
uniformed patrol and detective functions, each state has specialist squads who are
trained and equipped to deal with emergencies, including riot and disaster management.
Policing at the national level is the province of the Federal Crime Agency, which
concentrates on offences against state security and international crime. It also provides
services to the state police that are most efficiently delivered at national level, such as
forensic analysis. Federal Border Guards are responsible for protecting the national
borders and aviation security, and have become more prominent with the growth of
transnational threats.
A distinguishing feature of German policing is its adherence to the ‘principle of
legality’ that formally requires police officers to investigate all crimes that come to
their attention. This denies German officers the legal latitude that is afforded to their
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English counterparts who are free to exercise their discretion about how to proceed
with a breach of criminal law. As in the Netherlands, the police in Germany conduct
criminal investigation under the direction of public prosecutors.
Like the Dutch, German police officers are routinely armed and all three European
countries are bound by the European Convention on HumanRights that requires that use
of lethal force must be necessary and proportionate. However, it is worth noting that in
both the Netherlands and Germany it is permissible for police to fire at escaping suspects
under limited circumstances, whereas no such option is offered to the British police.
Any allegation of misuse of force is investigated internally in Germany and referred to
the public prosecutor, there being no independent investigation or adjudication.
Australia
Modern Australia was colonised in the eighteenth century by British settlers and was a
penal colony during this initial period. Today, Australia is an independent prosperous
federal state of 21 million people. Since World War Two, it has forsaken its previous
dependence on British immigrants and become a vibrant multicultural society, but
strains continue to be felt in relations between Indigenous Australians—who suffer
deprivation and discrimination—and the more prosperous settler population.
When the six component colonies coalesced into a Federation in 1901 they
retained their state-wide police systems responsible for the full range of policing
duties, as too does the Northern-Territory. In 1981 the Australian Federal Police
(AFP) was formed with three principal functions: local policing of the Australian
Capital Territory around the city of Canberra; national and international policing;
and more recently (together with the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation)
has a leading role in the ‘war on terror’. In 1990 the AFP was restructured along the
lines of an FBI. Whilst officers are routinely armed, state police maintain specialist
units to deal with serious armed incidents and riot control.
The criminal law inAustralia is a matter for each of the six states, with reserve powers
vested in the federal level of government. Heightened security consciousness in
Australia, as elsewhere, has been translated into politically controversial extended police
powers and some transfer of policing and security functions to the federal authorities. In
common with England and Wales the police are entitled to exercise discretion in how
they fulfil their duty and inevitably it is street-level officers that do so most frequently.
Australian police forces trace their origins back to the civil traditions of Britain
and in many isolated communities they performed the wide range of duties
characteristic of ‘community policing’. However, policing in Australia in the
nineteenth century was also profoundly influenced by the militaristic colonial style
of policing common throughout the British Empire. It is instructive that routine
arming of police officers has been a relative recent innovation in all states (with New
South Wales in 1970 being the first state to have armed operational police). The
police in the more expansive though thinly populated states, especially on the gold-
fields and amongst mining communities, earned a reputation for heavy-handed
suppression of labour unrest and abuse of Indigenous people was common.
Australian police formally avow commitment to ‘community policing’ and a
‘service’ ethic. Guidelines emphasise that only minimum force proportionate to the
risk posed is permissible and priority is formally given to ‘effective communication
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and conflict resolution’. In common with others, officers have recourse to an array of
weapons, other than firearms, so that they can act proportionately in the face of
violence. Since the mid-1980s Australian state police forces have become subject to
civilian oversight of varying levels of rigour. There has also been a succession of
highly visible public inquiries into police wrongdoing, especially in connection with
the use of force, followed by more or less rigorous processes of reform. As in many
other police forces, racism is perceived as common amongst lower ranking officers.
Venezuela
Venezuela is a former Latin American colony of Spain from whom it secured
independence in 1821, becoming a sovereign state in 1830. It suffered from political
autocracy until 1958, when a democratic government was installed. However,
popular perceptions of economic mismanagement and corruption caused chronic
political instability, and it experienced most recently two general strikes and a
military coup in 2002, all of which failed. Throughout the twentieth century
Venezuela benefited from the exploitation of rich oil and other mineral deposits that
remain at the heart of its economy. However, like other Latin American countries it
continues to suffer high levels of economic inequality and its major cities are notable
for the ‘barrios’ that surround them in which an economically marginal section of
the population scrapes a living. Although almost universally Spanish-speaking,
Venezuela is ethnically mixed as the result of inter-breeding between Spanish
colonizers, native tribal people, and slaves of African heritage. More recently, during
the turmoil in Europe during the 1930s and 1940s there was large-scale immigration
from the Iberian peninsula and southern Europe, and the oil boom in the 1980s
prompted migration from Asia and the Middle East. Instabilities in the region have
also added to immigration, especially from Colombia. Official homicide rates have
risen precipitately in recent decades, fuelling widespread fear of crime and prompted
vigilante actions, including the ‘lynching’ of suspected criminals.
Venezuela is a federal system, comprising 23 states. Executive power is vested in
the President and Council of Ministers, whilst the judiciary (including public
defenders) are headed by the Supreme Court. Its legal institutions are founded upon
the European civil law tradition, exhibited for example in the codification of criminal
offences. Radical amendments to the Code were introduced in 1999 replacing the
inquisitorial with an adversary system and curbing police powers. Whilst it has
subsequently been ‘toughened up’ by further amendments, police undoubtedly have
fewer powers now than they had previously.
Policing follows the contours of government. The national government has five
police forces: the Judicial Police responsible for criminal investigation accountable
to public prosecutors; the Political Police is part of the Ministry of the Interior and
deals with national security; the National Guard is attached to the Ministry of
Defence and protects the national borders and a miscellany of internal responsibil-
ities; the Traffic Police controls highways; and the Military Police is devoted to
crimes such as rebellion and desertion. All 23 states and the Capital District possess
their own police forces operating under state law, within the oversight of the
Ministry of the Interior. Some of the larger municipalities also have their own police
forces, but despite pretensions to the contrary, the major institutions of criminal
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justice (judicial police, courts, prisons) belong to the national government. Attempts
have persistently been made since 1977 to simplify this abundance of overlapping
jurisdictions, so far without success.
Venezuelan police are routinely equipped with firearms and batons, but only rarely
with other less-lethal weapons. Equipment standards are poor with unsophisticated
weapons and shortages of supply. Some police and all National Guard officers carry
long barrelled firearms, in the latter case assault rifles. Rules for the use of force are very
general, largely confined to firearms, varied between jurisdictions and relatively
unimportant in officer training. Each police force has guidelines but they offer little
specific guidance on how or when force is justified. Some guidelines use restrictive
rhetoric (such as, force must be ‘strictly necessary’) but violations do not constitute a
crime. The Criminal Code limits the use of firearms to self-defence and maintenance of
public order, and improper use of the firearm could be a criminal offence. Parallels may
be legitimately drawn with the law and official guidance regulating the use of force in
the countries discussed above, but the defects of such generalities are reinforced by
training regimes that emphasise technique (such as marksmanship) rather than instilling
restraint. This is compounded by the virtual absence of refresher training and any record
of those occasions on which force is used.
There is little accountability regarding the use of force by police officers. Citizens
may complain, but unless complainants are members of the ‘respectable’ sections of
the population, they are unlikely to be recorded, still less investigated or adjudicated.
‘Shoot-outs’ between police and alleged criminals are commonly reported in the
press, but excite little attention. Human rights activists estimate that in a 12 month
period there were 435 civilian deaths in shoot-outs reported in the national press. In
addition, there are strong suspicions that police participate in ‘death squads’. The
Human Rights Ombudsman estimates that 379 homicides during 2003 were
suspected extra-judicial executions. Yet, despite official reports drawing attention
to the issue, little political action has followed except on those occasions when
‘respectable’ citizens are directly involved. Whilst such activities are not entirely
unknown amongst the countries discussed previously, the scale and normalisation of
such killings sets Venezuela and its neighbour, Brazil, apart.
Brazil
Brazil is the last jurisdiction amongst the array represented in this research. It is the
country with the largest territorial area in Latin America and has a racially and
culturally very mixed population of 190 million residing mainly on the Atlantic
coastal strip. It was colonized by Portugal in the sixteenth century, achieved
independence in 1822 followed by a protracted period of political instability and
military coups. It is now a democratic federal republic comprising 26 states. Brazil
survived a severe financial crisis in the 1990s and is now one of the world’s largest
and fastest growing economies, and is self-sufficient in energy. Like Venezuela, there
are considerable inequalities and poverty is concentrated in the favelas (shanty towns) on
the edge of large cities that have become notorious as citadels of crime organised by
well-armed and ruthless gangs. Crime rates, and especially violence and kidnapping,
are high (UNESCO reported 40,000 firearms fatalities in 2007 alone). Prosperous
classes increasingly isolate themselves in walled communities patrolled by private
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security firms. Less prosperous sections of the population are inclined to resort to
vigilantism, administering beatings and sometimes killing those they suspect of crime.
Legal institutions reflect the civil law traditions of continental Europe, with a
codified system of criminal law. Unusually, jurisdiction is not only defined
territorially, but also through specialised military, labour and electoral courts, all
presided over by the Supreme Federal Tribunal.
The principal police agency is the Military Police that is constitutionally aligned
with the military, but under the control of each state’s governor. However, policing
in Brazil bears the scars of its birth as a colonial gendarmerie preoccupied by the
necessity of repressing by overt coercion incipient revolt amongst the large
population of slaves. This tradition was reinforced during the Cold War period
when a series of military juntas were in power and police received instruction from
US advisors on counter-insurgency strategy and tactics. The death squads that have
made the Brazilian police so infamous were a by-product of this counter-insurgency
emphasis but targeted at gangsters, suspected petty criminals, and even children
living on the streets. Despite shedding military rule, the political influence of the
police remains (fuelled, no doubt, by widespread fear of crime) so that the institution
has successfully resisted reform.
In addition to the Military Police is a much smaller Federal Police that falls under
the responsibility of the Justice Department with responsibility for combating drug
trafficking, weapons smuggling, and money laundering. It too has been implicated in
the worst excesses of policing in recent years. The Civil Police have general policing
functions, but unlike the Military Police they have no accountability to the federal
government and no allegiance to the armed forces, but instead are solely responsible
to the Governor of the state and subservient to the political purposes of their master.
Big cities also have their own Municipal Guards under the direction and control of
the mayor. There are also administrative police forces, whose main operational focus
is in regulating traffic and who have an unsavoury reputation for oppressing street
vendors. With other policing agencies too numerous to itemise, the total police
establishment approaches half a million officers. These arrangements succeed in
creating fragmentation, internal competition and inefficiencies.
Police use of force is nominally governed by the Penal Code that outlaws
disproportionate and excessive recourse to force. However, the police hierarchy,
judiciary and general public are tolerant of excessive police violence provided it is
directed at marginal sections of the population. Despite enacting laws against torture,
abuse of those in custody remains commonplace. Police Board Reviews are internal
accountability structures that are almost wholly ineffectual, serving to shield errant
officers from the full rigours of the Penal Code. Ombudsmen, Parliamentary
Commissions of Inquiry, and Human Rights Commissions have proved slightly
more effective mechanisms of accountability, exposing and denouncing abuses, but
are hobbled by insufficient resources and intimidated by the threat of retaliatory
violence from accused officers. They must also endeavour to get their voices heard
above the clamour of the popular press and mass media for more vigorous anti-crime
measures that pay little or no heed to human rights.
Internal discipline within police forces is characterised by a militaristic structure
and culture. However, bureaucratic inefficiencies leave most police officers with
only meagre training, especially in the police use of force. Little attention is paid to
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using alternative methods of dispute resolution or exercising restraint in the use of
force. On the streets, the levels of admitted killings by police officers is truly
astounding, especially in Sao Paulo where in 1992 killings reached 1,482 during that
year and whilst reduced subsequently never fell below 300 annually. The victims of
these killings are overwhelmingly poor non-white male juveniles. Apart from these
‘on duty’ killings, police officers are responsible for a significant number of killings
whilst ‘moonlighting’ as security guards.
It is apparent that the six jurisdictions in which focus groups were held spanned
an enormous variety of historical, social, cultural, legal, and organisational
conditions. Police organisations and officers are not autonomous: they exist within
a particular set of such conditions which are frequently invoked as explanations for
how policing is delivered on the street. In Britain explanations for the restraint with
which force is employed are found in the culture of deference, the doctrine of
‘policing by consent’ and the fact that police are not routinely armed. By contrast, it
is the colonial origins of policing in Australia that are often held responsible for
contemporary strained relationships between the police and Aborigines. The
authoritarian policing of grossly unequal Latin American societies is often thought
to account for torture and the presence of ‘death squads’. If so, then we can
confidently anticipate that these differences will be detected in focus group
evaluations of police conduct depicted in the scenario that remained a more or less
common point of reference for all those who participated in this research.
Talking about the scenario
Groups of officers in these widely varying jurisdictions were presented with a scenario
that was largely the same, but customised to fit local conditions. It consisted of three
stages: first, two patrol officers see a vehicle with darkened windows, causing a traffic
obstruction, and when one of them approaches he or she detects the odour of cannabis
and the occupants are abusive towards this officer. He or she identifies one of the
occupants as a known local petty criminal and soon afterwards the car drives away at
speed. Secondly, the patrol car pursues the escaping vehicle at speed until the latter
crashes. Thirdly, the two occupants jump out of the vehicle and run off, one of them in
possession of what appears to be a gun, which he brings into the aim and fires. After
each stage was read to focus groups, they were invited to discuss and evaluate the
actions of the officers depicted in the scenario, and envisage what might happen
subsequently. This section of the article will summarise those discussions, stage-by-
stage, but before we do let us acknowledge one important feature of those discussions
that was universal: that is, the absence of complete agreement. At each stage there were
divergent and even discordant voices amongst our focus groups, which in the course of
being summarised might become unavoidably muted.
Stage 1: Initial contact
What was universally agreed by all participants was that the encounter described in the
scenario—a couple of young men from a marginal section of the population, at least one
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of whom is known to the police, found in circumstances that attract the attention of the
police and upon closer inspection are suspected of drug use—is utterly routine. English
officers laughingly referred to it as ‘business as usual’. In the view of all focus groups
there was ample legal justification for approaching the vehicle and once the cannabis
smoke was detected by the officer there is no legal impediment to arrest.
Some officers advised caution in approaching the vehicle depending on the general
circumstances. Unarmed English officers1 were attentive to the description of the
location as a ‘rough’ part of town and the time as dusk on a summer’s evening. They
said that they would pay attention to who was in the vicinity and whether they might
become embroiled in a confrontation with a group. For instance, if the car was parked
near a café in which young people from ethnic minority backgrounds congregated, then
they might not bother to take any action because it might incur too much risk in return
for insufficient benefit. However, it should be noted that officers who crewed Armed
Response Vehicles shared no such inhibitions. ‘They know us. They know our cars.
They know not to mess with us!’, was the view of one such officer. Australian officers
also felt from the outset that this situation should be approached warily: ‘They’re not
going to want the police. They’re going to resist.’ For Australians the hypothetical car’s
blackened windows represented a threat: “you don’t know who you are dealing with.”
They felt it prudent to call the control room to “get more info on the car, some
background on the car... you may have a reasonable amount of background knowledge
on the car.” Some officers advised touching the car’s windows or paintwork so as to
leave a fingerprint that would identify it later, should it drive off or further offences be
committed. Officers in Germany expressed similar reservations, but concern was more
muted than their unarmed English or armed Australian counterparts, whereas Dutch
officers were initially more phlegmatic, treating the scenario as very mundane.
In both Latin American jurisdictions caution and wariness were elevated to a far
higher level, because of the pervasively high level violence. In Venezuela, whilst the
situation was considered not only routine, but a legally petty infraction that was
unlikely to merit prosecution, it was also fraught with danger—the street is a hostile
environment for the police: “When you engage in such a procedure, people from the
shanties start throwing rocks and bottles.” The occupants of the car were also
defined as dangerous from the outset: “while approaching the car they [the officers]
could be shot at”; “you don’t know what they have in the car”; “the car can move
and run over the officer.” They favoured approaching the vehicle cautiously, keeping
apart to prevent simultaneous attack; stressing the suspiciousness every officer
should have in everyday routines, the need to be “suspicious” or “wary” about the
risk of the youths using firearms. One view was that the officers should not approach
the car on foot, but should give directions via the patrol car’s loudspeaker to the
occupants of the suspect car to alight from it with their hands up. All Venezuelan
focus groups shared a fear of imminent attack: “We stop them, they are suspects, we
verify for whatever. You have to follow your ‘nose’, as they say; everyone is armed
and could hurt you, because it has happened many times: you stop them for running
a red light, you don’t suspect anything, the guy has just committed a robbery and he
is armed, and when you approach him... well there have been a lot of officers killed
1 The English focus groups comprised two groups of unarmed officers, and two groups of routinely armed
crews of Armed Response Vehicles.
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that way.” In Brazil some officers equated poverty and criminality: poor
neighbourhoods have lots of criminals and are therefore more dangerous to work
in. Hence police have to be more ‘energetic’ in low income neighbourhoods. Dusk
makes things more difficult and risky because it is less clear who the police are
dealing with. In the face of such risks the police culture of “maximum suspicion”
encourages officers to conjecture about potentially negative possibilities, such as
suspects carrying firearms, or involved in drug trafficking, or having a hostage in the
trunk of the car—a view that prescribes the utmost caution.
Whether as a routine operating procedure or because of the potential for danger,
focus groups in all six countries agreed that the control room should be notified at
some early stage in the initial encounter. English officers envisaged the driver of the
police car routinely asking for the registration number to be checked whilst his
colleague approached the car, as did their counterparts in the Netherlands, Germany
and Australia. As the scenario developed with evidence of drug-use and the abusive
reaction of the car’s occupants, focus groups agreed that back-up would be
requested. Australian officers drew a distinction between rural and urban environ-
ments, for in the former ‘back-up’ might be some distance away and, therefore,
should be summoned earlier, rather than later, whereas in towns one might expect
back-up to arrive speedily. All of this testifies powerfully to a common feeling of
vulnerability. English officers felt the least vulnerable (and armed officers exhibited
few concerns about their vulnerability at this stage), but even though all focus
groups agreed that this was a ‘routine’ encounter, it was still one redolent with risk.
The waft of cannabis smoke from within the car, the abuse from its occupants and
the fact that one of them was known as a local criminal was universally treated as
grounds for heightened suspicion. Abuse was dismissed by English officers—“it
goes with the territory” was a frequently voiced response. Australians too felt it best
to disregard abuse and obscenities. In the Netherlands and Germany there was an
emphasis on remaining cool and calm in the face of such provocation and avoiding
needless escalation. Whilst focus groups in both Latin American countries agreed
with the need to remain calm, abuse was viewed more seriously as displaying lack of
respect for the police, especially in Brazil. “If you are going to approach someone
and you perceive them to be calm, to be speaking calmly, you are likewise going to
act calmly; but if you see them to be agitated, you are also going to be agitated.”
Abuse and evidence of petty illegality immediately placed the occupants of the
car into the category of ‘disreputable’. However, the connotations of that
classification were most pronounced in the Latin American context. In Brazil, it
was said that “a criminal cannot be treated as a citizen; the police treat citizens as
they should be treated” and “…unfortunately, there are a lot of ‘marginals’. So how
is the officer going to know that the man is a citizen?”
Amongst European and Australian focus groups there was a large measure of
agreement that the use of force should be avoided, however there was disagreement
within all four jurisdictions about when the situation had deteriorated to the point
where force would become justified. The aim was to get the occupants out of the car
and the keys out of the ignition. In the Netherlands considerable emphasis was given to
persuading verbally the occupants to comply, if at all possible. Officers would “Have a
chat” with the occupants, remain amicable and only use powers if necessary—“it’s the
tone that makes the music”, they said.
122 P.A.J. Waddington et al.
Where police favoured approaching the car, it was to the driver’s side that they
would go and most would open the car door rather than await the window being
lowered by the occupants. Only unarmed English officers failed to mention this: they
saw nothing unproblematic about talking to the occupants through an open window.
Their armed counterparts, by contrast, would open the car door and felt that as soon
as there was evidence of cannabis smoke, abuse and recognition of a minor criminal
they would grab the ignition keys and ask the occupants to alight. Failure to comply
would result in the driver being “dumped on the ground”. German officers took
much the same view: it would be preferable to gain compliance by request, but
disrespect would prompt firm action. German officers expressed the view that it was
imperative to maintain respect and that once there was resistance it should be
overcome assertively. This was not a view shared by all focus group participants in
the Netherlands where some officers felt that such an intervention would escalate the
situation: “Over here we do not do things like that”, whereas others took the same
view as some of the focus groups in other countries that greater assertiveness was
appropriate: “My way or highway”—that is, get out of the car or be dragged out. In
Australia too there was some debate about whether refusal to alight from the car
would prompt immediate arrest or less forceful action.
In Venezuela, focus groups also stressed the need to be polite, but once there was
evidence of criminality and resistance forceful action would swiftly follow:
We are dealing with two people we know; they have a police record; the car is
probably stolen and they are adopting an aggressive attitude toward us… we try
every way get the guys out of the car, including blocking it off, but sometimes
they refuse to obey, arguing that they are the brother of the president of
whatever, and I have no right to pull them out of the car… but these guys, you
know, they are “two jewels” [a mocking expression meaning two punks].
Brazilian focus groups felt that they would unholster their firearm as they
approached vehicle, but also preferred to issue commands. They were alone in being
incredulous that the occupants of the car would not comply. On the other hand, they
would remain vigilant, insisting at all times that they could see the occupant’s hands.
In sum, there are distinct similarities in how police in the various jurisdictions
consider it appropriate to act in the circumstances described in the scenario. First,
whilst a routine encounter, officers are wary: they all agree that they would inform
the control room of their location and begin a routine vehicle check; once they met
any resistance they would ask for back-up and if the environment was hostile or
isolated they might do so in any case as a precaution. However, the degree of that
wariness varied enormously: in Europe and Australia officers were attentive to their
safety and the possibility that the encounter might reveal something serious or spiral
out of control, but in Venezeula and Brazil there was much greater perceived danger.
That danger lurked in the potential criminality of the car’s occupants—they may be
armed—and the reaction of residents in the neighbourhood—who might throw rocks
at the police. Secondly, all focus groups stereotyped the young men as potentially
threatening ‘problems’ and often described them as ‘scumbags’, ‘low-life’, ‘jewels’,
or ‘punks’, certainly not ‘citizens’ deserving respect. Thirdly, all focus groups shared
the view that it was imperative that they maintain control, but that control extended
to controlling their own reactions to the abuse received from the occupants of the
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car. Most of them favoured getting the occupants out of the car and key out of the
ignition. Fourthly, focus groups agreed that the preferred option was to achieve this
by oral means, but if the occupants failed to comply there was a large measure of
agreement that force would be used.
Stage 2: Car chase
In the second stage of the scenario, the car suddenly drives off. This was regarded by
most officers as the predictable consequence of the failure effectively to control
Stage 1. Venezuelan officers even used terms like ‘police misconduct’ to describe it
and saw the remaining scenario stages as confirmation that Stage 1 had been handled
badly.
Given that this contingency had arisen there was remarkable agreement across all
jurisdictions of the obligation on the part of the police to balance public safety
against arresting the car’s occupants. In England this led to three views: first, that
pursuit was not worth the risk and that the occupants of the car would ‘come again,’
that is come to the attention of police in future in connection with offences.
Secondly, was the view that the officers would commence pursuit of the escaping
vehicle but would be ordered to desist once they informed the control room. Thirdly,
some focus group participants thought that officers would, at least, be tempted to
delay informing the control room or dissimulate in order to continue a pursuit that
would otherwise be called off. In the Netherlands there was a similar debate between
those who felt the imperative to “get these guys,” whilst others took a more cautious
approach: there was insufficient reason to pursue and it would expose other road
users to unjustifiable risk of harm.
In Germany and Australia there was greater agreement that the car would be
pursued, albeit with caution for fear of exposing other road-users to danger. Here
they articulated more consensually the minority view in England that the ‘hunting
instinct’ (as German focus groups referred to it) would prove irresistible. They
acknowledged that the legal justification for pursuit was slender, but pointed to the
emotional, adrenalin-fuelled, desire for the police not to suffer humiliation. In
Australia it was seen as equally “natural” to pursue those who flee from the police,
for it was necessary to “draw a line in the sand.” However, here too they expected to
receive an instruction to desist from the pursuit once the control room was informed.
Once the pursuit had commenced there was also agreement that it was necessary to
mobilise further resources to bring it to a safe conclusion. In England, the scenario
envisaged that an Armed Response Vehicle was in the vicinity and joined the chase,
but this was regarded as so unlikely as to be fanciful by the focus groups composed
of unarmed and armed officers alike. So too, was the possibility of air support in the
form of a helicopter.
These same concerns were no less important for the Brazilian focus groups and
again there was no consensus. They too were attentive to the danger to bystanders,
the likelihood that they would be ordered to cease the pursuit, and the risk of being
held responsible for any misfortune that might arise: “in those circumstances, you’re
in danger of getting reprimanded; you crash the car and you have to pay the
damages, you risk being put on trial.” There was also the danger to the officers
themselves: “you can die because you’re after a vagabond.” Here too there was
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recognition of the primal urge to pursue those who flee; an urge that should be
resisted: “We don’t want to be a hero or to act like a wild animal, right?”
Very similar considerations were voiced by Venezuelan focus groups. Participants
felt the same temptation to pursue those who flee: “You have to live the experience. It’s
something unplanned. Your adrenaline gets high.” They too used the imagery of
hunting: “Like a tiger that hunts a deer.” On the other hand, they also felt the need to
balance this instinct against the dangers to bystanders and the restraining hand of official
policy that would probably order cessation of the chase. If there was to be a collision,
even if it only involved the police car, the pursuing officers might find themselves held
responsible. However, ambiguities in official policy did allow some room for
manoeuvre that officers in these circumstances might exploit to justify the chase.
In Germany and Venezuela focus group participants raised the prospect of using
greater force to terminate the chase, but did so to rule out these options. German
officers expressly ruled out either ramming or shooting at the car, because of the
danger than an uncontrolled collision would have for innocent bystanders.
Venezuelan officers also debated whether it was legitimate to open fire on the
escaping duo, but the majority dismissed it as an inappropriate response.
In all jurisdictions it was felt that official policies that restricted the capacity of
patrol officers to pursue fleeing vehicles were unrealistic (because of the imperatives
of the ‘hunting instinct’) and inappropriate (because it impeded the enforcement of
the law and allowed suspects to escape justice).
Stage 3: Armed threat
In the scenario it is envisaged that the pursued car is involved in a collision, that the
occupants decamp and run off, and that one of them is perceived to be in possession
of a firearm that is, after a short while, aimed at the police and then fired. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, it was this stage that evoked the most intense debate in all
jurisdictions. The terms of that debate were remarkably similar: prudence of giving
chase on foot; danger to bystanders; justification for opening fire; alternative tactics
in the situation.
In England the scenario was modified to contrive the availability of armed
officers at the scene of collision. There was a striking difference of opinion between
focus groups composed of armed and unarmed officers about how the armed officers
depicted in the scenario would and should deal with the situation as described.
Hitherto, the focus groups composed of armed officers had been noticeably more
assertive in their approach to the scenario: they entertained no hesitation in
approaching the vehicle when it was obstructing the highway and would have acted
assertively once they detected cannabis smoke; they also imagined that as qualified
pursuit drivers they would be permitted to chase the escaping car. Unarmed officers,
by contrast, were more wary and thought it less likely that they would be allowed to
pursue the vehicle. Once the car had crashed and the occupants decamped, with one
of them apparently in possession of gun, the balance of opinion was reversed. Now,
it was armed officers who became wary and cautious, whilst their unarmed
colleagues expected an armed confrontation in which shots may well be fired.
English officers had to envisage a process that did not apply elsewhere, for even
the crews of Armed Response Vehicles (at least in this force area) were not routinely
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armed, but instead were required to obtain authority from a senior officer before
taking weapons from the armoury on-board the vehicle. Focus groups of armed
officers did not share the belief of their unarmed colleagues that they would receive
that authorisation, or indeed that upon seeing what apparently was a gun in the hand
of one of the escaping duo, that this would provide sufficient legal justification for
authorising themselves to be armed because of the imminent threat. Their view was
that there was insufficient legal justification: in the scenario intelligence reports
linked the vehicle with a drugs-related shooting, but armed officers viewed that with
the utmost scepticism. What does ‘involvement’ entail, they asked? The vehicle may
simply have been in the vicinity of the shooting at the same time, which they felt
was hardly surprising given its current occupants and their apparent lifestyle—“These
are not nice people” the officers pointed out. From what source does this ‘intelligence’
come? It could just be gossip or mischievous: “For all I know, it could have been some
bollocks told to a detective by a snout” (that is, unreliable information provided by an
informant). ‘Errol King’ is known to police and either or both of the car’s occupants
appear to have been consuming cannabis, but that (armed officers were anxious to
point out) was not a threat to life. One of the occupants appears to be in possession of
a gun, but armed officers emphasised that it was ‘appearance’ rather than reasonable
certainty. The question that armed officers asked rhetorically and repeatedly was
“What have we got?” and the answer was repeatedly that there was nothing
sufficiently substantial to justify arming themselves.
Even when armed officers were invited to imagine that they had been authorised
to arm themselves, they continued to express the utmost caution. They pointed out
that it takes time to open the armoury on-board the vehicle, extract the weapons, load
them, and don body armour; by which time they anticipated that the escapees would
have disappeared from sight. If, by some extraordinary circumstances either or both
of the duo remained in view, officers would be reticent about giving chase. First,
they pointed to the need to preserve the scene of the collision. If the car was in some
significant way ‘involved’ in a drugs-related shooting, then it would need to remain
secured for forensic analysis. Secondly, even if one of the escaping duo was in
possession of gun, that did not necessarily mean that it was the only gun they had
and that no other firearms had been left in the abandoned vehicle. To set off in
pursuit of the escapees might leave a lethal threat inside the car. Thirdly, crews of
Armed Response Vehicles do not patrol the same locality habitually, so they are
likely to be unfamiliar with the area, unlike those who they would be pursuing. The
danger, therefore, is that if there is anything incriminating in the wrecked vehicle, its
occupants might return and, if armed, would pose a threat to the unarmed officers at
the scene. Fourthly, a foot pursuit of two escapees would be inherently dangerous.
“I’m not running around a corner into who-knows-what”, said one focus group
participant. “What if the two of them split up?” asked another rhetorically. It would
be imprudent for each of the officers to pursue their quarry separately, because
officers are deployed in pairs each to guard the other and with two armed officers in
an area with which they were unfamiliar they might lose contact and then later cross
each other’s path with the danger of a ‘blue-on-blue’ shooting.
Tempted again to consider the possibility that one of the escaping duo turns and
aims what is plainly a firearm in the direction of officers, focus groups of armed
officers still maintained their cautious approach. In such circumstances there would
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be ample legal justification for them opening fire upon their adversary, but other
considerations intruded. It would be necessary for them to consider the ‘backdrop’:
in other words, the situation around the armed man and in the arc of fire beyond
where any bullet fired by police might continue its trajectory or, even more
unpredictably, ricochet. The scenario indicates that it is a populated area: there might
be innocent bystanders who would be endangered by any exchange of fire,
especially from any appreciable distance. “If I fire a shot at an escaping scumbag and
miss, it could hit a mother pushing a pram.”
Armed officers were unanimous: they would remain with the wrecked vehicle,
summon a helicopter, additional armed officers, and conduct a methodical search of
the area using police dogs. Thus, in stark contrast to a foot chase by armed officers,
followed by a confrontation and shots fired, envisaged by focus groups composed of
unarmed officers, their armed colleagues exhibited considerable caution.
The caution exhibited by focus groups of armed officers, may be thought to be a
reflection of the unarmed tradition of policing in Britain. After all, in all the other
jurisdictions represented in this research, officers are routinely armed. There would
be no requirement to obtain authority to arm themselves and delay in doing so.
Would they more readily give chase? Would they open fire if confronted? First, it is
important to appreciate that the scenario depicts circumstances that are extraordinary,
certainly for the European and Australian police. As officers in Germany were at
pains to point out, once the scenario reached Stage 3 it rapidly exceeded their
experience and became hypothetical. Nevertheless, the same caution was evident not
only amongst European and Australian officers, but also (with some qualifications)
amongst their Latin American counterparts. Dutch officers would not routinely draw
their handgun to approach the vehicle after the collision, nor to pursue the erstwhile
occupants of the car as they escaped. If the escapees were clearly in possession of a
gun, the officers envisaged unholstering their own, but they were acutely aware of
the presence of bystanders. Some officers questioned the scenario because it
involved operating “untactically.” Likewise, German officers thought that the correct
thing to do was to attend to any innocent bystanders hurt in the collision with the
escaping vehicle. However, it was recognised that the ‘hunting instinct’ might take
over. Even so, there was debate and disagreement about whether it was appropriate
to unholster one’s own firearm; instead, it was considered better to keep the escapees
in view from a distance. The danger of the escapees finding themselves trapped and
being faced with the prospect of ‘standing and fighting’ was something to be
avoided and opening fire was seen as wholly exceptional and only conceivable as a
very last resort, not least because focus group participants were acutely aware of the
limitations of their own marksmanship and their weaponry.
Australian officers agreed that the first priority following the collision would be to
attend to any innocent bystander who had been injured. The first preference would
be to contain and control the escapees and their car, possibly by blocking it in with
their own vehicles. If the occupants escaped they advocated giving descriptions to
the control room, mobilising specialist armed officers, police dogs and a helicopter,
and warning bystanders in the vicinity that armed criminals were at large. Given that
they knew the identity of one of the escaped occupants they saw no justification in
taking risks to arrest either of them. However, like their German counterparts they
accepted that the ‘hunting instinct’ might tempt them into giving chase, in which
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case they agreed with Dutch officers that they would follow at a distance. If the
escapees disappeared into a shopping mall, officers would not follow them for fear
of provoking panic amongst shoppers and an armed confrontation in a crowded
environment. Instead, they would enlist the support of CCTV to follow the escapees
within the mall, whilst they would cover the exits from outside. Their approach was
summarised as one of playing for time: “Plenty of time, don’t have to rush, take your
time, and the end result is that nobody gets hurt;” “take it at our pace, not their pace;
it’s a police thing to catch the crooks straight away, but sometimes you have to sit
back and take your time.” There is time to plan, time to enlist other units. As one
officer put it: “Get every bloody unit there from Christendom.”
Here there is a gulf between the European and Australian focus groups, on the
one hand, and those in Latin America, on the other. Venezuelan focus groups
favoured immediately unholstering their handgun once the pursued car comes to rest
after the collision, because: “We don’t know if they are armed or not, and they can
shoot at us… so, first us, our safety;” “or they are waiting for us to approach them so
that they can shoot at us;” “these people aren’t hurt, they get out firing at the officers,
so we must be alert to an exchange of shots in such a situation;” “they could even
open a window and throw a grenade at us.” At the same time, officers are acutely
aware of their legally precarious situation: “using the gun requires several steps, such
as putting your hand on it, grabbing it, unholstering, aiming, putting your finger on
the trigger and shooting, all of which are steps that are evaluated by the prosecutor
and the judge. So you will have the gun on hand just for prevention, in case after the
crash the suspects are not hurt and get out of the car firing at the officer.”
The Venezuelan version of the scenario envisages the occupants of the car emerging
with gun in hand and running off, firing at officers as they go. The fact that the
escaping occupants of the car have opened fire upon pursuing police officers justifies
police firing in return on grounds of self-defence. The “golden rule” seems to be that
the suspect fired first, or at least (but not so good) that he was on the point of doing so.
Shooting someone in the back is difficult to justify in these terms and therefore is
imprudent because of the likelihood of disciplinary or legal repercussions. Many
comments referred to the subsequent reconstruction of suspicious facts, such as the
position of the corpse at the scene. Officers frequently said that they have to justify
self defence at a trial, and the fact that many incidents end with the death of the
civilians “is not because of the mere fact of their being armed, because you have not
yet justified your action, but because our shots are precise.” Whilst initially officers
might have sought to arrest the occupants of the car, once the firing begins killing
them is regarded as inevitable. “If he is armed and exchanges fire with the police, he
would end up dead;” “This guy is already dead;” “this guy is luncheon meat.”
Members of the Venezuelan focus groups were attentive to the danger posed to
innocent bystanders in any exchange of fire. They agreed with common police
practice in other jurisdictions that forbids the firing of ‘warning shots.’ Like their
European and Australian counterparts they were concerned about the prospect of
accidentally hitting the archetypal innocent bystander, for instance “What if someone
is hanging the clothes out to dry?” They felt vulnerable to accusations that they have
acted carelessly in such circumstances. However, rather than deterring officers from
becoming involved in a violent confrontation, this concern prescribes the firing of
‘safe shots’—that is, well aimed shots at the torso of the adversary.
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Much the same applies in Brazil: the legal justification upon which officers rest
their actions is self-defence and like their Venezuelan counterparts they seek to avoid
harming bystanders by the accuracy of their marksmanship. This poses problems
because officers feel that they are ill-trained: “imagine... a police officer who is not
prepared psychologically and technically... the “marginal” [suspect] runs right over
them; you understand?” To remedy this, some officers pay for additional firearms
training and ammunition with which to practice.
In sum, despite Latin American focus groups being presented with a more
confrontational version of the scenario that invites the option of police returning fire,
the members of these groups imagine doing so with considerable trepidation: fearing
that their shots might hit innocent bystanders and having to justify their actions to a
sceptical judiciary.
Discussion
What is so striking is that in jurisdictions that in so many respects are so very
diverse, police talk about the use of force in such similar ways.
It is helpful to briefly set out the continuities and discontinuities. There was near-
universal agreement that: the scenario depicted a routine encounter and yet risk and
danger were present, although the perceived extent of such danger varied
enormously; the young men in the car were viewed with complete distain and yet
it was important for officers in such situations to remain cool and calm, especially in
the face of abuse; the imperative to assert control was uppermost in the minds of
police officers; the ‘hunting instinct’ might instigate risky behaviour, such as chasing
the escaping car; control rooms would probably order the cessation of a car chase;
official policies that prescribed cessation of the chase inappropriately favoured ‘the
bad guys’ and were impotent (the ‘hunting instinct’ would prevail); safeguarding
bystanders was a priority throughout; law on the use of lethal force was restrictive
and could only be justified by an immediate threat to life. Systematic disagreements
were restricted to whether or not to: unholster one’s firearm immediately; give chase
and, if so, how closely; and open fire on the fleeing suspects.
Could this be an artefact of the method employed? We consider this to be
unlikely. To mitigate the effect of social desirability, this research made clear
throughout that its focus was upon how officers evaluated and justified action in
such a setting. Nevertheless, members of focus groups openly acknowledged the
extent to which the ‘hunting instinct’ might encourage officers to breach rules, and
voiced their opposition of restrictions such as those governing vehicle pursuits. Most
importantly, it was our collective experience that focus groups engaged very deeply
with the scenario and officers argued volubly over competing courses of action. This
was captured most starkly in the differences between focus groups of unarmed and
armed English police officers. In short, our focus groups echoed no simple
consensus. Hence, our confidence that what our focus groups reveal are how
officers in these jurisdictions justify, evaluate and explain police conduct.
European and Australia focus groups diverged from their Latin American
counterparts at the most perilous moments in the scenario, especially giving chase
to suspected armed criminals and willingness to open fire. This is congruent with
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reality: as was seen earlier, there is a vast gulf between European and Australian
police and those in Latin America in the number of people they shoot and kill. So,
this difference in talk and expectation should not be dismissed as merely
hypothetical. Moreover, the scenario and focus group methodology proved to be
sensitive to differences of approach amongst English focus groups composed of
armed and unarmed officers, for they diverged markedly in directions that are
counter-intuitive: the armed officers being more cautious than their unarmed
colleagues when presented with the potential of an armed confrontation in the
scenario.
What might we extract from our focus groups that sheds light on the difference
between English, Dutch, German and Australian officers, on the one hand, and their
Latin American counterparts, on the other? First, we must note the clear normative
continuity between all the focus groups and the jurisdictions they represent. In many
discussions of police use and abuse of force in Latin America emphasis is placed on
how the police are inadequately regulated [12, 13]. Legal institutions are depicted as
impotent and public opinion, filtered through the mass media and political
institutions, is thought to encourage police violence [14]. All this may well be true,
but our focus groups gave little indication that officers felt able to shoot suspects
with impunity. On the contrary, Latin American officers referred to how judicial
investigation would interrogate each movement in grasping, drawing, aiming,
fingering the trigger and firing their gun. They felt compelled not to shoot a suspect
in the back and emphasised that opening fire was justified only in self-defence. They
pointed to how the position of any corpse would be examined at the scene for
incriminating evidence of unjustified shooting. This might lack the rigour of a 5-year
long investigation and trial, such as that to which two English officers were exposed
when they shot and killed a man wrongly thought to be in possession of a shotgun,
which turned out to be a table leg, but equally Latin American officers did not
appear to believe that they had carte blanche to kill.
Why, then, did they regard opening fire as virtually inevitable? The answer was
that they perceived that they faced a hugely greater level of threat throughout the
encounter. In Europe and Australia, in so far as officers perceived there to be risk
and danger in approaching the car, it lay in the car driving off or the possibility that
in this ‘rough part of town’ associates of the occupants of the vehicle might become
obstructive. So, in England the expectation was that the patrol car driver would
remain in the vehicle with the engine running, whilst checks were conducted on the
suspects’ car. The driver’s companion meanwhile would approach the driver’s door
and open it. In the Netherlands emphasis was given to talking to the occupants and
persuading them to alight from the vehicle and avoid needless escalation. Once
resistance and abuse was experienced a more forceful response was to remove the
ignition key and pull the driver from his seat.
This is markedly different from a near-identical scenario in Venezuela or Brazil.
Here, the police saw themselves as facing the prospect that they would have been
physically assaulted by other residents if they alighted from their patrol car. They
feared from the outset that the occupants of the car were armed. Some wondered
whether they might not prove to be kidnappers with a hostage in the trunk of the car.
The perceived danger was such that some officers advocated hailing the car’s
occupants over the loudspeaker and inviting them to alight with their hands up.
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When the pursued car collided and came to rest, officers already feared that the
occupants would emerge guns in hand and ready to shoot, or wait until police
approached and then open fire. Whilst Latin American officers regarded the prospect
of armed criminals firing their guns ‘over the shoulder’, their counterparts in the
other jurisdictions regarded the armed encounter as an exceptional turn of events.
German focus groups found this utterly beyond their experience. Not even the armed
officers in England had fired their weapons operationally. In Australia, the scenario
was so exceptional that it justified mobilising “every bloody unit... from
Christendom”.
Disposition or situation?
This distinction in the situation in which officers envisaged the scenario taking place and
its impact on what they expected would happen resonates with the longstanding debate
within academic circles about whether it is the disposition of officers or situational
factors that explain recourse to force in actual encounters [15]. Dispositional
explanations can be divided into those emphasising personality and those that give
more weight to culture. Toch [16] is perhaps the most eloquent exponent of the view
that personality is the main influence on behaviour, echoed in the Christopher
Commission [17] whose report on the Los Angeles Police drew attention to the small
proportion of officers whose profile of use of force and complaints regarding their
behaviour suggested they were aberrant (see also [18, 19]). It was concern that officers
with a propensity to violence might be recruited in specialist armed squads in Britain
that promoted the use of psychometric testing ([20, 21], see also [22]). Whilst most
personality differences are fairly randomly distributed in the population, gender
differences are not. There is considerable dispute about whether and to what extent
female officers are as prone to using force as their male colleagues: some research
claims that women officers are markedly less likely to use force [23–25] whereas other
studies indicate little or no difference exists [26–29].
Such personality based arguments have their critics, as Adams points out:
It is probably true that a small number of officers are involved disproportionately
in use of force incidents, but it may also be true that this is a statistical artefact
and that with time their pattern regresses to the mean (contra the Christopher
Commission) [30].
Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that the disparities in rates of police shootings
and killings across different jurisdictions (including those represented in this
research) could conceivably be due to vastly higher concentrations of ‘violence-
prone officers’ in some jurisdictions rather than in others.
Cultural explanations share the underlying dispositional assumptions of Toch’s
‘violence-prone officers’, but attribute it to a different source—the culture either of
the society in which they work or, more specifically, the culture of the police.
General societal explanations have been used to explain differences in police
forcefulness over time [31]; between regions of the US [32]; varying social
circumstances, such as society-wide stress [33]; and between different countries [34,
35]. More common are explanations that emphasise the specific influence of the
police culture, especially its glorification of violence [4, 5, 36]. Specialist squads are
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thought to be particularly prone to developing a violent sub-culture [37], but this is
not supported by other evidence [38].
A specific and particularly relevant version of dispositional explanations is that
which explains differential levels of use of force by police against ethnic minorities.
This leads to the conclusion that racism (whether a product of personality or culture)
may reach all the way to the trigger finger [39–47].
Situational theories of police use of force look not towards the dispositions of
officers in explaining why they act coercively or otherwise, but towards the
circumstances in which they act. This, of course, evokes a longstanding debate in
social psychology between personality and situational explanations of human
behaviour generally [48, 49]. In respect of policing, situational explanations also
divide into two: those that consider the immediate situation and those that stress the
wider circumstances. Features of the immediate situation that might precipitate a
forceful police response include such factors as the offence for which a person is
suspected [50]; degree of resistance shown by suspects [51]; the number of police
officers present at the scene [52]; and much else besides [53].
Whilst immediate situational factors explain a great deal of the variance between
the use of force by officers within cities in America, it leaves unexplained the
variance between cities. Skolnick and Fyfe [36] describe how police departments can
autonomously adopt aggressive policing policies that result in hugely dispropor-
tionate levels of police use of force. Even in the absence of such distinctive policies,
cities can vary significantly. This was the focus of Liska’s [54] research: he found
that background factors, such as the proportion of non-white people living in cities,
the degree of segregation between racial groups, general homicide rate and size of
the police force were correlated with differences in the use of lethal force by police
officers [55]. He hypothesised that the more sizeable the non-white population the
greater was the threat to the interests of the white majority, which police action
focused on controlling threat by repressive means.
Of course, in our research the scenario was hypothetical and we can adduce no
evidence that it reflected the actual behaviour of any of the officers involved in our
focus groups, and certainly we can make no judgement of how widely focus group
discussions represented the voices of others. Nevertheless, our evidence suggests
that the distinction between dispositional and situational theories of police use of
force is unhelpful. On the one hand, it might be said that the results of our focus
groups are more consistent with situational rather than dispositional theories. Focus
groups displayed little divergence in terms of their adherence to the general
principles that lethal force was only justified by an immediate and credible threat to
life and that the interests of innocent bystanders were paramount. Neither was there
much difference between them regarding official policies and the likelihood that the
use of lethal force would be followed by intrusive examination of the justification for
their actions. In short, they shared common values and knowledge that might be
expected to restrain them in the use of force. What distinguished the European and
Australian focus groups from those convened in Latin America was their perception
of threat [54]. That perception is clearly justified for levels of crime and violence are
far higher in Latin America than in Europe and Australia [56]. This was reflected in
the focus group discussions: in Europe and Australia, the use of guns was regarded
(even in jurisdictions whose police are armed) as exceptional. By contrast, in Latin
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America it was perceived as quite likely that suspects would be armed, and might even
be in possession of grenades, and they would show little hesitation in using those
weapons! Hence, officers anticipated that the normative requirements for opening fire
were likely to be met. Accordingly, they envisaged taking precautions, such as not
approaching the suspect vehicle and unholstering their firearms at an early stage.
On the other hand, our data clearly demonstrates that risk is a perception. Our
focus groups were considering an explicitly hypothetical situation to which they
brought their beliefs, expectations and anxieties. The environment in which Latin
American police work clearly parallels the conditions that Liska and Yu identify as
threatening in American cities: large ethnic minority population, residential
segregation, high levels of homicide and deprivation [55]. Of course, in Latin
America there are also differences: first, in Venezuela, there has been much racial/
ethnic intermixing and thus one cannot say that the barrios hold a large ethnic
minority population. Secondly, in Brazil, skin colour remains as an important quasi-
racial classifying criterion, but the “blacks” in Brazil are not really considered to be
ethnically separate, just socially and culturally inferior. However, on the face of it,
these appear to be external, objective facts about the environment that are linked to
variations in police use of lethal force.
Yet, these variables are not simply stark facts to which people are condemned to
react, they are mediated through interactions between individuals, even if those
interactions can become lethally confrontational, as Liska and Yu observe:
Most police homicides occur when police interrupt a robbery or burglary in
progress or intervene in a social disturbance, including family quarrels, fights,
and assaults. Because of cultural beliefs linking nonwhites to street violence
and crime, police may feel particularly threatened in neighborhoods and cities
where the percentage of nonwhites is relatively high. [55: 68. Italics added]
As Liska and Yu also concede in this passage, the background variables are also
mediated through ‘cultural beliefs.’ The fact that people—police officers or anyone
else—believe things, does not mean that those beliefs are untrue. Indeed, Liska and
Yu’s own analysis implies that police officers are aware of the relative size of the
non-white population and prevalence of homicide. However, it is certainly also true
that people may hold erroneous beliefs: believing things that are untrue and failing
or refusing to recognise the truth. Belief, perception, cognition, and so forth, are
crucial mediating factors between social conditions and action. This is particularly so
with respect to threat: for threat is a complex cognitive operation that entails not
only an intuitive calculation of the past (the proportion of adverse outcomes to the
total number of outcomes), but also a projection into the future (what will others in a
particular situation actually do?). Moreover, these calculations may need to be made
with respect to diverse others. Contemplating using lethal force involves not only
assessing the risk of being fired upon by an adversary, but also the risk of causing
harm to bystanders, and the likelihood of future investigation. Sometimes it extends
to the ‘moral hazard’ of allowing ‘scumbags’ to be disrespectful of police authority.
This is precisely the territory over which our focus groups were invited to
navigate. They were not asked about whether they agreed with general principles or
norms, but were presented with an unfolding specific scenario. Whilst hypothetical,
it was universally regarded as credible, especially during its initial stages. Focus
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groups had the opportunity, not afforded to police officers in actual situations, to
reflect upon and discuss what would be appropriate actions in those circumstances.
By these means the participants made explicit the beliefs, perceptions and cognitions
that they bring to any such encounter.
Culture
We have been cautious so far in referring only to how officers talk about force, but
whilst actual behaviour in a situation cannot be inferred directly from how officers
talk about it, that does not mean that talk is irrelevant to action. If it did, precious
little criminology would be relevant to explaining how people act, because it is rare
to witness directly deviant behaviour and virtually impossible to do so under
anything remotely resembling controlled conditions.
This raises the issue of culture, especially police culture, and its role in mediating
experience and moulding a sense of ecological threat. Three features of our focus
group discussions are notable in this context: first, that our scenario evoked
considerable and at times intense discussion. So often, police culture is treated as
though it is a monolithic set of rules and recipes for action, but in our focus groups,
when faced with a scenario that at least begins as a routine encounter, officers argued
and disagreed about the best course of action. The overview given here of those
discussions hardly does justice the extent of such debate. For example, in England
there was a profound disagreement between focus groups composed of armed
officers, on the one hand, and unarmed officers, on the other. This suggests that
instead of conceptualising culture as a set of relatively uncontested directives, it may
be better conceived as ways of imagining what circumstances might be like and how
variously to respond to them. Shearing and Ericson ([57], see also [58]) have
proposed that culture generally, and police culture in particular, is conveyed mainly
through story-telling containing tropes that are readily recognised. Officers bring to
the canteen or other backstage areas [59], their experiences that they relate usually as
narratives. In the collective ‘repair shop’ where anecdotes are exchanged [60],
salient features are identified and alternative courses of action are recommended (for
example, see [61] for an analysis of the divergent ways in which RUC officers coped
with the threat of terrorist violence).
Our scenario methodology fits very well with this conceptualisation of police
culture, for it too consisted of a story (albeit conjured by academic researchers rather
than the officers in our focus groups themselves) and, at least in its initial stages, was
readily recognisable. For instance, the brief sketch of the occupants of the car was
sufficient to evoke a richly textured understanding of what such a person was like
and how they were likely to react. Although officers differed about how the suspects
should be dealt with—for instance, some Dutch officers felt that it was better to talk
to the occupants of the car despite the latter’s abuse, whereas others would have been
more forceful (“My way or the highway”!)—there was implicit agreement that
officers must retain control of the situation, including themselves. When the car was
described as speeding off, this was widely regarded as evidence of incompetence.
Secondly, insofar as the participants in our focus groups were expressing cultural
assumptions and stereotypes, it was a very far cry from how police culture is often
conceptualised in academic analysis (see [6] for a general discussion). Yes, officers
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did feel the tension between their ‘hunting instinct’ and the constraints of official
rules that they almost universally regarded with disdain. However, the overwhelming
sense of caution that was voiced by all sits oddly on the lips of officers whose
culture is renowned for its machismo [62]. In Europe and Australia officers exhibited
restraint, even when considering a scenario that invited forceful intervention and
since it was hypothetical it involved no real consequences. If this was just talk, then
why not open fire on an escaping youth apparently armed with a gun, who has led
officers on a perilous chase and collided with an innocent bystanders’ vehicle? Isn’t
that what ‘Dirty Harry’ would do? [63] But our focus groups were not composed of
‘Dirty Harry’ wannabes. Their attention was focused on the legal and normative
justification for using force, and in all cases on the danger to bystanders. Perhaps this
is most acutely evident in England, for the focus groups composed of armed officers
might be expected to represent the most macho variant of police culture. These
officers form an elite who specialise in the use of lethal force, and yet it was they
who repeatedly exhibited the most caution. “What have we got?” they repeatedly
asked, and the answer that they gave was that the situation did not warrant the use of
lethal weapons.
Thirdly, this research is a distinct, if not unique, exercise in cross-cultural
comparison. Police cultures are most often analysed in isolation; occasionally,
comparisons are drawn between police and other sections of the population
(although the extent to which this can be consider ‘cultural’ is doubtful since it
usually relies on the methodological individualism of questionnaires and attitude
scales); sometimes, police from different jurisdictions within a society are compared;
but to compare police in different countries as we have done is rare (Klockars et al.
[64] are an honourable exception). Yet, it is only by making comparisons across
diverse cultural contexts that it is possible to draw conclusions about the extent to
which police culture is universal or reflects the peculiarities of its wider cultural
context. For instance, Chan’s sophisticated research on policing in New South Wales
[34, 65] concludes that cultural change is inhibited by the colonial origins of
Australian society and its policing structures. Yet, focus groups in the neighbouring
Australian state of Victoria did not exhibit the differences that such a heritage
suggests. Neither is there a detectable gulf between police in England, the
Netherlands and Germany. Not only is the Channel culturally bridged, but so too is
the globe. Yet, there is a difference between these otherwise diverse countries and those
of Venezuela and Brazil. Our explanation for these differences lies in how officers in
different social circumstances perceive threat. However, threat not only lies in the
barrel of a gun that is pointed at an officer, it also lies in the extraordinary exemption
that is given to police to use force, possibly lethal force. All our focus groups exhibited
a clear realisation of how exceptional were the powers and responsibilities that they
exercised. We tentatively suggest that this is a commonality of police culture—it is
cautious, because officers believe they are surrounded by threats.
Conclusions
This research consisted of focus groups in six diverse countries discussing a near-
identical scenario. This elicited richly textured discussion and debate amongst the
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officers who participated. Our over-arching analysis of that debate concludes that
there are remarkable continuities across focus groups. They agree that the scenario is
a routine encounter, yet one that poses risks that need to be managed by a
combination of firmness and tact. Once the suspect car drives off, officers feel the
tension between the imperative to follow their ‘hunting instinct’ and the restraints of
official policies that preclude car chases. It is in the final stage of the scenario that
clear differences emerge between European and Australian focus groups who are
wary of provoking a potentially armed confrontation, on the one hand, and, on the
other, Latin American focus groups, who regard such a confrontation as inevitable.
We suggest that this is explicable as different cultural appraisals of the level of threat
posed in policing marginal populations in these different social and physical
environments.
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